At 1600 hours on 11 June, the battalion was alerted for movement. By 2100 hours, the battalion was assembled on the IX Corps parade field on Riverside Drive prior to moving out. After traveling all night, the battalion arrived in X Corps area shortly after daybreak. There it was learned that the movement order had been amended and that the battalion was ordered into position in II ROK Corps area in the 5th ROK Division sector east of the Pukhan River.

By 1640 hours on 12 June the battalion advance party arrived at the new position (9543 grid) and the main body closed at 2000 hours. By 2205 that night the battalion was firing and, at 2305, enemy counter-mortar fire inflicted the first casualty on the battalion, a mortar crewman from Company C. This enemy fire increased and, by 0015, Companies B and C were under heavy shelling.

At 0200 Company B called for a litter jeep, and Captain Magaurn, company commander and two other casualties were evacuated from Company C at the same time. The battalion S-3, Captain Wance, went up into the company area himself to supervise the unloading of the ammo trucks and to get them out of the area being shelled. During the rest of the night and all the next day the battalion fired steadily. The ammo truck drivers worked all night and most of the next day bringing in ammunition resupply over a most difficult mountain road. The personnel of the ammunition trains, because of the action at OP Harry, the move and the heavy action immediately following the move, worked for three days and nights with only what sleep they could catch at infrequent stops when trucks were being loaded and unloaded. At this time the battalion operation began a fire direction net conference call. All company FDCs, the battalion FDC and the OPs maintained connected phones manned 24 hours a day. This proved an eminently satisfactory arrangement during periods of active combat. By means of this conference call, all companies and FOs were kept informed automatically of changes in the tactical situation, fire missions were greatly expedited and battalion was able to maintain close control of firing and observation. This conference call paid big dividends on many occasions by speeding up reaction time of all elements of the battalion to tactical developments.

During the night of 13-14 June, many enemy sightings were reported by battalion Ops and adjacent and higher units. The battalion fired all night against enemy probing attacks of platoon or company size. Col Wetherell, commander of the 11th ROK Field Artillery Group, stated that the battalion covered its fire missions quickly and effectively and with destructive effects.

By 0920, 14 June, it was necessary to stop vehicle traffic to Companies B and C because of the amount of enemy incoming artillery.

The battalion was informed this same morning of plans for a friendly attack the next day and an attempt was made to limit fire missions to conserve ammunition for this effort. However, at 1815 strong enemy preparation fire began hitting the friendly MLR, and requests by infantry units for fire support became urgent so the battalion began shooting. By 1840 the enemy attacking Hill 949 was known to be at least battalion size and, by 1930, another enemy battalion was assaulting Hill 739. The mortar companies were now firing at maximum rate.

At 1939, Lt Kral of Company C was reported wounded on the OP, and Lt Kruse was sent to replace him. Both these officers and their OP party were later declared MIA since they were unable to get out when the enemy overran their position.

Within the next hour and a half enemy contacts were reported all across the sector, and the enemy artillery fire in the battalion area became extremely heavy. At 2120, Company B suffered a direct hit on their switchboard and three KIA resulted; another hit in a Company A gun pit caused 1 KIA and 10 WIA. At 2150 hours another hit in a Company A gun pit set the ammo on fire and the gun crew made heroic efforts to extinguish the fire or at least keep it from spreading.

Because of the destruction of Company B's switchboard, it was necessary to radio fire missions to them or send messages from nearby Company C.

About this time, ROK infantry in groups of ten and twenty were beginning to drift south through the battalion positions. The battalion aid station was filled with American and Korean wounded.

At 2235 a series of severe ammo explosions shook A Company area, destroying three gun pits, and secondary explosions began spreading from gun pit to gun pit. As these explosions lighted the sky, the enemy began directing TOTs into the A Company area. A Company was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of the Battalion FDC. All contact was now lost with OPs, and the road adjacent to the Battalion FDC was clogged with ROK wounded and other ROK personnel falling back from the MLR. At this same time, three friendly tanks withdrew through the Battalion area followed by a large number of ROK infantry.

It was now exceedingly difficult to move around the Battalion area because of 300-400 Korean troops milling around attempting to enter bunkers and climbing into Battalion vehicles; the area guard had to be doubled and Battalion officers made an attempt to organized the ROKs.

At 2245, C Company reported that all attempts to stop ROK troops moving south were unsuccessful, and enemy semi-automatic weapons fire was already falling in B and C Company areas. By now more than 500 ROK troops were moving south through the area. Enemy artillery was very heavy and many Battalion vehicles were knocked out. B and C companies were firing minimum charges and maximum rate of fire.

At 2250 hours, Hq Company and A Company personnel were ordered to deploy in defensive positions 150 yards north of Battalion FDC. B Company's ammo had been set on fire by incoming enemy artillery, and C Company gun crews were returning enemy small arms fire coming from their front and left flank, while at the same time maintaining their firing of the mortars.

At 2310, the Battalion was ordered to move to alternate positions. All Battalion vehicles which could be moved were loaded and started back; walking personnel were assembled in a column of twos and marched out. The unit ambulance and a 2½-ton truck were loaded with American and Korean wounded and evacuated.

The movement orders were changed at 2400 hours and the Battalion was assembled at 5ht ROK Division KMAG Headquarters. The first recapitulation at that point showed the following losses: 5 KIA, 15 WIA, 17 MIA. Equipment losses were very great because of heavy enemy shelling, the fires in the company ammunition pits, the impossibility of moving equipment through the mass of friendly troops withdrawing through the narrow defile of the

Battalion area, and the speed with which the CCF overran the MLR and the Battalion position. The Battalion fired over 11,000 rounds during this action. Throughout the action the wire crews of the companies and Battalion Headquarters distinguished themselves by their courage and diligence in constantly repairing land lines to the OPs and between the companies. Only by continually re-laying multiple lines between stations was it possible to maintain any wire contact at all, so heavy was the shelling of the area.

By evening of 15 June the Battalion went into position behind the 8th ROK Division at Chipsil-Li (8745 grid). At 2100 hours, the Battalion FDC was operative and C Company was ready to fire with seven guns. Two FOs were out from each company observing terrain from west of Finger Ridge to southeast of Lookout Mountain. At 2155 hours, the sector became active and C Company began firing to the left of Finger Ridge; incoming artillery fell sporadically on all Battalion forward positions throughout the night.

By 2000 hours on 16 June all three companies were shooting, A Company with one 5-gun platoon, and B and C Companies each with one 4-gun and one 3-gun platoon. Shortly before midnight, a CCF patrol infiltrated into the 50th ROK FA Battalion area where the mortar Battalion was located. A patrol was sent out by the ROK FA Battalion to intercept the Chinese.

During this night, 16-17 June, all companies fired almost continuously. The next day too, repeated enemy attacks down Finger Ridge were met by mortar fire from the Battalion. For the next few days enemy artillery was heavy throughout the Battalion area, but good deep foxholes in the vicinity of all gun pits, kitchens etc, prevented many casualties. At this time, the 5th FA Group directed the Battalion to attempt to remain out of lesser actions and to conserve ammunition for bigger threats, to be prepared to act as a “Sunday Punch.”

On 25 June, an especially heavy shelling knocked out all land lines to higher headquarters and adjacent units, but the Battalion/Companies wire net remained in because four lines had been laid between all stations in the Battalion. Between the dates 26-29 June, Lookout Mountain (Hill 529) changed hands nine times. During these days the Battalion fired repeated preparatory and defensive missions depending on the tactical situation in the vicinity of this fiercely fought over terrain feature. Smoke missions and many TOTs were fired and the Battalion was repeatedly complimented by ROK commanders, KMAG advisers and artillery FOs on the speed, accuracy and killing power of its fires. Throughout these days the mortar crewmen of the Battalion stayed in their gun pits shooting despite a vigorous enemy counter mortar program. On many occasions it was necessary to suspend vehicle movement in the Battalion area because of heavy enemy incoming artillery and mortar fire.

On the night of 30 June, the enemy launched a strong and eventually successful attack against Hill 690 at the southwest end of Finger Ridge. During this action A Company sustained a direct hit on a gun pit which killed one and wounded nine. Despite this misfortune, another crew climbed into the gun pit while the wounded were still being evacuated, and kept the gun in action. Also during this action the Battalion fired its 100,000th round since the 461st Infantry Battalion took over the men, equipment and mission of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion.